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Policy making ‘front’ and ‘back’ stage: 
Assessing the implications for effectiveness and democracy  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to examine the complex interrelationship between ‘front’ and ‘back’ 
stage policy making. ‘Front stage’ describes the activities of visible and accountable office-
holders in elected bodies, constrained by established bureaucratic rules. ‘Back stage’ describes 
the world of unseen decision making where public officials are less constrained by formal rules 
and public scrutiny. Drawing on a recent case study of English devolution in the United 
Kingdom, this article examines how front and back stage policy making shape one another and 
the impact this can have on policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. Findings reveal 
that policy makers need to think more explicitly about the interplay between front and back 
stage activities. In the context of English devolution, the transition from back to front stage has 
been flawed. Central government’s purposeful strategy of informal negotiations with very few 
formal objectives has resulted in low stakeholder buy-in, which has mitigated against the 
potential effectiveness of back stage decision making.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This article examines the interaction between ‘front’ and ‘back’ stage policy making. More 
specifically, how an over-reliance on ‘back stage’ negotiations can impact on policy 
implementation at front stage. Friedman (1995, 16) states that ‘front stage, actors are visible to 
the audience and have to stay in role’. Public officials are observable and accountable as office 
holders in elected bodies and are constrained by established bureaucratic rules, codes of 
conduct and public scrutiny (Klijn, 2014). ‘Back stage’ describes the world of complex 
decision making where public officials are hidden from public scrutiny and can engage in 
negotiations less constrained by formal rules: ‘back stage, actors can relax from their roles, 
step out of character and work with their dramaturgical teammates to prepare for the front stage 
performance’ (Friedman, 1995, 17).  
 
This article will explore the management of the transition between the two stages. It will 
examine the contribution back stage decision making can make to policy problems which 
cannot easily be solved by traditional governance approaches. It will also explore how 
informality can weakens democratic accountability and threaten policy implementation. These 
issues will be examined via an analysis of ‘devolution deals’ negotiated between the central 
government and a number of localities in England (Political Studies Association, 2016). This 
area of policy is highly suited to analysing the interrelationship between front and back stage 
policy making for the following reasons. First, English devolution has recently attracted a lot 
of front stage attention (Kenny, 2016), via commitments ‘to devolve powers and budgets to 
boost local growth in England’ (Conservative Party, 2015, 1). Second, the policy exhibits 
substantial reliance on back stage negotiations. Institutional processes and practices for 
developing devolution deals have been described as ‘almost entirely secret’ with details ‘being 
released only when agreements have been reached’ (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2015, 8). Third, 
the progress of the policy following its arrival at front stage has been mixed, making it a good 
opportunity to investigate the relationship between the two stages.  
 
Back stage policy making is, of course, a normal, even vital, part of any policy making process. 
It is often described as ‘greasing the wheels’ and is a familiar feature of the ‘British political 
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tradition’ (Richards and Smith 2015). However, ‘the devolution agenda is characterised by a 
particularly high degree of informal governance’ (Political Studies Association, 2016, 4). By 
contrast with the more formal and standardised structures and processes for implementing 
English devolution under the New Labour government (1997-2010), our findings reveal a 
distinct and purposeful strategy on the part of central government and other critical actors to 
locate discussions around devolution deals to the back stage. Particularly high levels of 
informality in the devolution deal process have been noted elsewhere (Randall and Casebourne, 
2016; Kenealy, 2016). However, this article makes an important and original contribution to 
the debate by offering the first examination of precisely how decisions were taken back stage, 
the implications for policy effectiveness and democracy and how critical actors managed the 
transition between the front and back stages. Evidence suggests that high levels of informality 
have led to a number of distinct advantages in the short term, including maintaining political 
momentum, dealing with complexity and uncertainty, building trust between critical actors and 
exploring innovative policy solutions. These are common rationales for adopting a back stage 
approach.  
 
However, we argue that the policy has been over-reliant on back stage. The transition from 
back stage negotiations to the front stage has been flawed, which could serve to undermine 
these benefits over the longer term. The emphasis on back stage has particular implications for 
a policy concerned with enhancing local democracy and bringing political decision making 
closer to those most affected. These, of all policies, cannot avoid active assent from 
stakeholders and the public at front stage. Indeed, this has produced an uneasy paradox of a 
policy that is supposed to be democratising being carried out in an undemocratic way. The 
government’s failure to clarify policy objectives and the inability of central and local ‘insiders’ 
to generate buy in from wider stakeholders means that the transition to front stage has not gone 
to plan, with a number of devolution deals subsequently collapsing (Sandford 2016). We 
conclude by suggesting ways to maximise the benefits of back stage decision making while 
mitigating the associated risks. This contributes to the governance literature on interactive 
governance (Torfing et al, 2012) by empirically exploring the potential downsides associated 
with softer, more relational aspects of decision making on the policy process.   
 
This article is divided into five parts. Part I provides a brief account of the English devolution 
policy context. Part II outlines the theoretical framework, including how the concepts of front 
and back stage policy making have been utilised, how they interrelate and their impact on 
policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. Part III sets out the article’s 
methodological approach and Part IV explores (i) how back stage decision making manifests 
itself in the devolution deal process (ii) the implications of back stage decision making for 
policy effectiveness and (iii) the implications of back stage decision making for democratic 
accountability. Part V reflects upon how this body of evidence can be utilised to offer insights 
into managing the delicate transition from back to front stage policy making.    
 
PART I. POLICY CONTEXT  
 
England has been a landscape of almost permanent administrative reconfiguration and 
rescaling during the last 50 years (Mawson and Bradbury, 2006). Successive governance 
‘solutions’ within England, imposed by the centre, have been largely economic and 
technocratic with regard to sub-national governance (Tomaney, 2016). It might thus be 
expected that governance changes in England would be low-key and uncontroversial. However, 
when tackling rescaling, UK governments of all colours have become bogged down in the 
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interplay between powers passed to localities, relations between levels of government and 
balancing central and local influence on policy, boundaries, and local accountability.  
 
The previous generation of English devolution policy, managed by New Labour between 1999 
and 2010, adopted familiar governance structures but detached them from local power brokers. 
Private sector-led Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and deconcentrated Government 
Offices for the Regions (GORs) retained the bulk of statutory powers and budgets. Local 
council leaders and stakeholders established Regional Chambers / Assemblies, which drew up 
‘strategies’ covering broad policy areas, adapting central policy to local conditions, and held 
scrutiny sessions to establish whether the strategies were being implemented. But they lacked 
the powers to enforce the strategies or to constrain centrally-directed actions. Thus the only 
locally-based element of ‘devolution policy’ had only a peripheral influence on regional 
economic, housing and transport plans. The set-up assumed the form of democratic governance 
without its content, leading to disputes between impotent regional actors and a central 
government that often overruled or disregarded their decisions. This, in turn, contributed to the 
eventual fading of the policy in the run-up to the 2010 general election (Pike et al, 2016a). 
 
A government sympathetic to devolving power, but concerned to avoid central-local disputes, 
could seek to relocate negotiations over institutional structures and relationships to the back 
stage. Devolution of power features potential conflict amongst those negotiating, an uncertain 
context, and a ‘large numbers’ problem (Ayres, 2017), all incentivising a back stage approach. 
This appears to have been the rationale adopted during George Osborne’s term as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (May 2010-July 2016). This generation of devolution policy renounced a 
comprehensive, governance-based approach in favour of bilateral, confidential deal-making. 
This was true of a round of some 28 ‘city deals’, negotiated between the Government and local 
representatives of functional economic areas (O’Brien and Pike 2015; Waite et al, 2013). In 
response to growing stakeholder and think-tank support (e.g. Cox et al, 2014; City Growth 
Commission, 2014), a series of ‘devolution deals’ were then negotiated, beginning with the 
Greater Manchester Agreement in November 2014 (Kenealy, 2016). Both species of deal were 
negotiated between central government and small groups of local government leaders and 
representatives of Local Enterprise Partnerships (private sector-led economic growth forums). 
Six of these deals led to the election of ‘metro-mayors’ in May 2017, with a seventh to follow 
in May 2018.  
 
Much scholarly output has critiqued the process of deal-making, whilst also predicting that it 
will lead to ineffective or failed policy once the new institutions are in place. A common 
argument has been that - contrary to Government rhetoric - English devolution deals do nothing 
to counter the power-hoarding character of the ‘British political tradition’. Blunkett et al (2016, 
556) suggest that underlying power relationships in the UK will continue to be characterised 
by ‘the resilience and inertia of the UK political tradition’. Richards and Smith (2015, 387) 
describe the process as ‘elite co-option that pays limited attention to the interest of citizens’. 
Commentary has focused on a rationale invoking economic growth, far more than democratic 
accountability (Lyall et al, 2015). Consultation on the proposals has largely taken place after 
the event, being difficult to access and, unsurprisingly, attracting relatively few responses 
(House of Lords 2016; Prosser et al, 2017). The devolution deals have been described as ‘super-
centralisation’ (Hambleton 2017) and compared to contractual relationships between central 
and local government (Sandford 2017).  
 
The use of ‘back stage’ policy making as an integral part of elite-to-elite negotiation is nothing 
new to the ‘British political tradition’. Yet, there is comparatively little research on how back 
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stage decision making operates or its impact on front stage policy outcomes (Jitske and Buuren, 
2016). ‘Indeed, much current literature assumes that actors’ incentives and expectations are 
shaped, primarily, if not exclusively, by formal rules’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2013: 85). This 
article responds to this gap in the literature by examining the way that decisions have been 
taken back stage and how this has impacted upon the success of the Government’s latest 
initiative to devolve power in England. 
 
PART II. THEORY 
Making the distinction between front and back stage policy making 
 
In recent years there has been an increased focus on informal or back stage policy making as 
part of a conceptual shift to the phenomenon of governance. The shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ implies that the nation state can no longer manage policy in isolation and instead 
must work with multiple actors at different spatial scales in order to realise objectives (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2016). This development has prompted a new style of public leadership - one that 
relies less on bureaucracy and formal structures and more on networks and informal relations 
(Barber, 2013). Back stage policy making is often associated with this shift, epitomised by 
‘soft’ or relational processes, co-operation and bargaining in policy making (Blomqvist, 2016). 
Back stage processes can also operate to enforce front stage bureaucratic hierarchy or market 
mechanisms by acting as a form of statecraft or meta-governance (Torfing, 2016). Meta-
governance can be defined as the ‘governance of governance’ and involves ‘deliberate attempts 
to facilitate, manage and direct more or less self-regulating processes of interactive governance 
without reverting to traditional statist styles of [hierarchical] government’ (Torfing et al, 2012: 
167). This perspective implies that back stage policy making has increased as policy makers 
try to deal with the complexities of governing in an ‘institutional void’ (Hajer, 2003). By 
contrast, others argue that the transition to governance has forced policy making increasingly 
to the front stage due to an explosion of information and closer scrutiny from non-state actors, 
including the media (Bovens et al, 2014). In reality, the picture is more nuanced than either of 
these two accounts and much will depend on contextual factors like, for example, the specifics 
of English devolution outlined above.  
 
The literature on informal governance provides more precise definitions of formal/front stage 
and informal/back stage governance processes. Christiansen et al (2013: 6) define ‘governance 
as informal [or back stage] when participation in the decision making processes is not or cannot 
be codified and publicly enforced’. Informal governance is un-codified, un-documented and 
has no trace beyond the recollection of the actors involved. By contrast, formal (or front stage) 
governance ‘is regulated by rules that have been instituted according to procedures recognised 
as legal in clearly defined contexts’ (Brie and Stolting, 2013: 19).  
 
Exploring the interrelationship between front and back stage policy making 
 
Both types of governance are present in all political systems. Their effect on outcomes is 
determined by their interrelationship: they can complement, support, impede or paralyse each 
other. Reh (2013, 68) argues that one way to manage the relationship is for back stage decisions 
to be ‘formalised’ within the front stage system. Decisions can take place informally but will, 
at some point in the policy cycle, need to be ratified and codified front stage for them to take 
effect. To achieve this, Friedman (1995, 17) notes that a key challenge is for actors to ‘construct 
a back stage environment as well as front stage drama, and to manage the movement between 
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these stages’. Lauth (2013) identifies three types of relationship between formal (front stage) 
and informal (back stage) governance: 
 
• Complementary: The two coexist side by side and mutually reinforce and support one 
another.  
• Substitutive: In which either formal or informal are effective in the sense of being 
functionally equivalent to one another.  
• Conflicting: When the two systems of rules are incompatible and where informal 
arrangements are used to undermine legitimate formal institutions and due process.  
 
If the formal (front stage) rules and informal (back stage) constraints are inconsistent with each 
other, the resulting tension can damage the democratic legitimacy of outcomes and produce 
political instability and policy failure. Reh (2013) argues that the legitimacy of informal 
decision making can be appraised using three key criteria: effectiveness, deliberation and 
accountability.  
 
The impact on effectiveness 
 
In terms of effectiveness, back stage practices can offer a number of advantages. First, they can 
help to manage policy complexity and uncertainty (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Informality 
may be prominent where the decision making context is uncertain, where the number of 
decision makers is potentially high and where conflict among negotiators is (or might become) 
intense. Informal governance can reduce the transaction costs of formal decision making and 
restrict the number of participants, thus providing a shortcut to reaching agreements. Back stage 
discussions or elitist decision making can help to avoid a ‘large numbers problem’ (Scharpf, 
1993), though it potentially undermines consensus and buy-in from a broader range of 
stakeholders. Second, informal arrangements can be seen as a coping strategy (Kort and Klijn, 
2012). However, the front and back stages need to complement one another to secure 
effectiveness.  
 
Third, informal relationships can help to build interpersonal and inter-organisational trust 
(Lane and Bachman, 1998). Trust has been shown to be a valuable asset in achieving network 
objectives. It can tackle strategic uncertainty and enhance the possibility of actors sharing 
information. However, translating high trust between individuals into an institutional form can 
be challenging. Fourth, informal agreements can help to break deadlocks in policy areas 
resistant to change and adaptation. Operating back stage provides an opportunity to deploy 
‘soft power’to exert influence. Soft power is non-binding, non-sanctionable, vague in context, 
flexible and deliberative (Blomqvist, 2016) and can allow actors to begin to explore what might 
have at first seemed like the unimaginable. Finally, operating back stage can also create an 
innovative culture for ‘inspiring, nurturing, supporting and communicating’ (Kickert et al, 
1997, 11). An ‘innovative-oriented culture encompasses both the intention to be innovative and 
the creation of a supportive climate for innovation’ (Wynen et al, 2014, 46). Operating back 
stage can help to overcome the predisposition for bureaucratic conservatism, leading to a 
dynamic culture of entrepreneurship.  
 
The impact on deliberation 
 
Deliberation denotes collective decision making with the participation of all who will be 
affected by a decision or by their representatives. Back stage decision making can create greater 
opportunity, flexibility and responsiveness in deliberation. For example, informal working can 
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broaden out the range of stakeholders beyond the formal institutions of representative 
democracy (Sorensen, 2016). It can help to include an ‘intermediate’ level of stakeholders 
between elected politicians and citizens and provide a ‘safe space’ to explore innovative and 
challenging policy solutions. But informality can also be used to marginalise critical actors 
from key decisions and further enhance the power and control of elites.  
 
The impact on democratic accountability  
 
This requires the decision making process to be open and transparent, including the ability to 
sanction decision makers, usually via elections. However, there is a danger that back stage 
decision making can undermine openness and transparency completely. As the ‘traditional 
foundations of political institutions are to be complemented or replaced by new institutional 
modes…accountability and legitimacy are becoming blurred’ (Klike, 2016, 86). A lack of 
transparency and openness can result in a mistrust of the governing institutions. For example, 
Whitley et al (2016, 234) argue that if the public ‘feel that the process of governing is unfair 
then they are likely to view the government as being both dishonest and untrustworthy’ - a 
situation with negative consequences for both democratic accountability and policy 
effectiveness. This type of change might suit policy makers in some circumstances. For 
example, Flinders et al (2015: 2) draw on the literature on ‘blame games’ and ‘blame 
avoidance’ to suggest that ‘politicians can create or tolerate increasingly complex and fluid 
governance structures as a rational self-defence mechanism when faced with apparently 
intractable socio-political challenges’. Their argument is that informality, governance and 
complexity is used as a form of statecraft to allow public officials the ‘wriggle room’ to avoid 
due process (democracy) and tough decision-making (effectiveness).  
 
PART III. METHODS  
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of ‘back stage’ policy negotiations is scant, partly because 
of the methodological challenges of analysing the informal (Jitske and Buuren, 2016). This 
research has managed to overcome some of the acknowledged complexities of exploring the 
informal by successfully negotiating access to the research field; utilising established 
professional contacts to build trust with respondents for open discussions; drawing on the 
legitimacy of the Political Studies Association’s Research Commission to encourage contacts 
to disclose details and clarifying confidentiality agreements so that participants felt comfortable 
in conveying potentially sensitive information. As a consequence, the research team were able 
to access data about back stage negotiations not in the public domain, thus providing a unique 
perspective on the devolution deal process. This enables a more analytical approach to the 
nature of back stage decision making, transcending a reliance on drawing inferences from 
secondary sources. 
 
This research has adopted an in-depth qualitative methodology aimed at providing so-called 
‘thick descriptions’ of the day-to-day practices guiding political actions (Rhodes, 2013). The 
analysis presented in this article draws upon the findings of research undertaken between 
March 2015 and May 2017 to explore how informal negotiations and relationships have 
impacted on the devolution deal process. It includes a detailed review of academic and 
government literature. Data collection involved fourteen face-to-face interviews conducted in 
December 2015 and a focus group involving eighteen senior devolution stakeholders in January 
2016. The interviews and focus group involved actors working on devolution deals in (i) central 
government (ii) local areas that had secured a devolution deal (iii) areas that were in the process 
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of negotiating a deal and (iv) think tanks and research bodies. Participants were identified 
through established professional contacts, a search of departmental websites and snowballing.  
 
Respondents were asked a series of questions about formal and informal procedures for 
negotiating devolution deals. These included whether they recognised the use of informality in 
the process; their motivations for using informal governance; their perceptions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of informal working and the impact of informal governance on 
the policy process. Interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes and the focus group 90 minutes. 
In both sessions confidentiality was assured. Detailed written notes were taken at the interviews 
and focus group by a nominated note taker. At the focus group participants were also asked to 
make notes in response to questions posed. These notes were collated and photographed to 
complement field notes. Data was manually coded to elicit findings.  
 
Three research questions have been identified to shape the analysis presented in this article: 
 
Q1: How does back stage decision making manifest itself in the devolution process? 
Q2: What are the implications of back stage decision making for policy effectiveness? 
Q3: What are the implications of back stage decision making for democratic accountability? 
 
PART IV. FINDINGS 
How does back stage decision making manifest itself in the devolution process? 
 
Findings revealed that the process of negotiating devolution deals consisted almost entirely of 
back stage discussions - behind closed doors with little, if any, debate in the public arena. This 
was described by one central government respondent as ‘a necessary evil, needed in order not 
to raise expectations’. Central and local government respondents also referred to the political 
sensitivities around negotiations as a reason to operate back stage. As a local government 
official said, ‘if we had opened up the process to more stakeholders and public scrutiny we 
wouldn’t have got started’. This explanation describes back stage processes being used as a 
coping strategy, to avoid the pitfalls of a ‘large numbers problem’ (Scharpf, 1993).  
Furthermore, the approach, parameters and goals of the negotiations were restricted to back 
stage. No published guidance was available on what localities’ devolution ‘bids’ should or 
should not contain. A central government official said ‘often when you provide written 
guidance people interpret it as hard and fast rules, so providing guidance at the start wouldn’t 
have worked’. Interview and focus group respondents indicated that the Government’s 
openness to new ideas was genuine and the focus on deliberation - identified by Elliott (2012) 
as so important in ensuring democratic accountability - was real. Local representatives, 
particularly from the more developed local partnerships, were able to assert their local 
preferences in negotiations and saw the lack of guidance as an opportunity for flexibility. One 
respondent from a think tank agreed that ‘local authorities described a process that was 
characteristic of genuine partnership working and co-production. This was seen as significantly 
different to the way in which Whitehall had attempted to work with local government in the 
past’.  
However, the negotiation process also revealed Government ‘red lines’. These were rarely 
overt, tending instead to emerge over time. For instance, it became clear at the focus group 
session that the Government had been unwilling to negotiate on pre-16 education, welfare to 
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work and fiscal devolution. One local government official at the focus group stated that ‘it 
wasn’t clear what was not included which led to an element of wasted effort, going down blind 
alleys. For example some of our thinking on education was wasted as it soon became clear this 
was not an issue up for discussion’. Though reported by the majority of respondents, these 
Government positions have never been officially acknowledged. This opacity evokes the 
‘statecraft’ approach identified by Flinders et al (2015). However, there is some evidence that, 
in this case, ‘fuzzy governance’ was used to finesse internal Government differences. One 
Treasury official spoke of ‘needing to be able to sell local proposals to other departments’. 
Indeed, findings revealed varying levels of enthusiasm for devolution both within and between 
departments - a feature common in the recent history of English devolution policy (Ayres and 
Pearce, 2013).  
Once a devolution deal is published the policy process pivots towards front stage, including 
ratification of the deal and passage of an Order through Parliament. The powers devolved are 
agreed back stage but delivery and the resulting policy outcomes remain front stage. Thus 
English devolution policy relies on complementarity between front stage and back stage 
decision-making (Lauth, 2013), but there is a sharp divide between them. For example, 
statutory consultation processes accompanying the creation of mayoral combined authorities 
have no opportunity to amend the deals (Prosser et al, 2017), while councillors expressed 
unhappiness at their omission from negotiations (Sandford, 2016; Blunkett et al, 2016). The 
transition to front stage, with the focus on the mayoralty, seeks legitimacy from actors who 
have been excluded from the negotiations. This in itself is unexceptional in policy-making, but 
when it concerns a policy predicated on local democracy and control it is arguably more prone 
to open dissent from those who have been excluded.  
 
What are the implications of back stage decision making for policy effectiveness? 
 
Assessing how the use of the back stage contributed to the effectiveness of this policy is 
challenging. Few clear statements of the intention of the policy have been published: the ‘aims, 
purposes and goals of decentralisation have multiplied and widened’ (Pike et al, 2016b:13). In 
formal documents such as the Productivity Plan (HM Treasury, 2015) and the Northern 
Powerhouse Strategy (HM Treasury, 2016a), commitments were made to devolution that seeks 
to maximise efficiency, deliver local economic growth and integrate public services. Beyond 
this, the Government has not provided a formal statement of purpose. Desired outcomes and 
indicators have been entirely absent to date (NAO, 2016). Despite this, respondents seemed to 
have a reasonable understanding of the broad objectives of the policy, as an official from a 
leading think tank explained: 
 
‘Government received some criticism over a perceived lack of clarity but actually it’s 
very clear. Economic growth is the driver, alongside greater local accountability. The 
bespoke approach allows for local priorities to shine through’.  
Broadly, the aim of the policy can be interpreted as implementing the devolution of power to 
localities within England. The following section explores how back stage negotiations have 
both assisted and undermined this policy aim.  
 
Managing complexity and uncertainty 
 
9 
 
In terms of obtaining a deal, back stage negotiation allowed substantial progress to be made in 
a short period of time. The political momentum behind the devolution deals was praised by 
respondents for activating change in an area of policy that was described by one local authority 
interviewee to ‘have limped along for years’.  Alongside the uncertain positions of both levels 
of government, the potential for a ‘large numbers problem’ (Scharpf, 1993) and the presence 
of a substantial number of ‘veto players’ (Kickert et al, 1997) in the form of council leaders 
are critical contributory factors here. Relocating decisions about what and how to devolve back 
stage meant that the process was less likely to be stalled by lengthy public disputes over powers 
and functions.  
 
However, the effectiveness of this approach is not so evident front stage. Ratification and 
statutory orders front stage serve to legitimise the deals struck back stage. But the two stages 
were not, in this case, as distinct as this implies. The devolution deal documents contain 
commitments in advance to specific policy outputs, terms for the exercise of each devolved 
policy, and evaluations. For instance, the Cambridgeshire / Peterborough deal sets out a number 
of planning powers, followed by a number of policies the Government expects to be pursued 
locally - including ‘strong partnership to support key large housing sites’…‘work[ing] with 
Community Land Trusts to deliver new schemes’, and ‘support[ing] the development of 
proposals for ambitious reforms in the way that planning services are delivered’ (HM Treasury 
2016b, 9-10). It is not clear whether a mayor with an electoral mandate will be free to reverse 
those agreed policies if s/he does not agree with them. The ‘deals have been offered on a take 
it or leave it basis’ (academic focus group participant).  
 
Central government has attempted to handle this tension by ensuring a degree of ‘wriggle 
room’ (Flinders et al, 2015) within the deals – as would be expected in the British political 
tradition. But the extent to which this has been done has damaged local actors’ trust in the good 
faith of the negotiations. The transition from back stage to front stage has thus seen a number 
of setbacks. Deals in the North-East, Greater Lincolnshire and Norfolk/Suffolk collapsed in 
late 2016, following councils in each area voting against participation (Sandford, 2016). In 
these locations the elected mayoralty has acted as a lightning rod for discontent from local 
stakeholders. But this may also reflect their omission from the back stage process. Controlling 
the ‘large numbers problem’ has come at the cost of inclusivity, and has caused the policy’s 
instigators to lose control of the ‘front stage drama’ (Friedman 1995).  
 
A coping strategy and building trust 
 
Findings revealed that back stage devolution negotiations served to generate trust in several 
ways. Local representatives at the focus group noted many times that Government intentions 
appeared more genuine than in previous similar negotiations. Government representatives 
derived trust in their local counterparts from the existence of clear business plans and tacit 
assent to the strategic direction of Government policy (Political Studies Association, 2016). A 
good local offer increases the chances of power being devolved and ‘serves to banish fears of 
inadequate local capacity’ (local government official). Conversely, some less successful 
localities noted a palpable failure to build trust. One local official stated that ‘the process and 
negotiations changed in tone and quality as things began to fall apart’. Suggestions have also 
been made that the process was characterised by uneven information between the two sides 
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(Pike et al, 2016b). In the longer term, interview and focus group respondents expressed doubt 
whether the Government had sufficient resources to maintain high trust relationships with 
multiple devolved areas. One local government official indicated that, ‘as our deal has been 
slipping away the civil servants we are dealing with have become less senior’. 
 
Trust also helped participants to develop a shared narrative. Many initial ‘bids’ were ambitious 
and expansive, seeking to take on full responsibility for policies such as the Work Programme, 
skills, education, housing capital spending, or aspects of health. This was at odds with the 
tentative, exploratory approach evident from Greater Manchester and other earlier deals. In this 
scenario, a back stage approach was viewed as advantageous to both sides. It enabled such 
demands to be quietly dropped without local political consequences. The back stage location 
also meant that a narrative about the nature of the deal could be agreed between participants. 
A central government actor explained this process:  
 
‘Because there were only a handful of us in the room I was able to have an open and 
frank discussion with our local partners about what elements of the deal were acceptable 
and how we could present final decisions to the public’.  
 
Central government representatives too indicated that their own thinking had developed over 
time as a result of the negotiations. They claimed that the typical contents of deals - post-16 
education, housing, employment support, transport and skills - emerged from negotiations and 
were not decided in advance. Think-tank representatives concurred, one referring to a ‘post hoc 
rationalisation of objectives’ at the focus group. It was essential for the success of this approach 
that negotiations were not leaked whilst they were ongoing. A number of local government 
respondents at the focus group indicated that the government had ‘impressed this upon us at 
the negotiation stage and had trusted us to comply’.  
 
Trust needs time to build. Many devolution deal areas do not enjoy the quality of inter-authority 
relationship visible in leading areas such as Greater Manchester. In some areas, local leaders 
were pitched into high-level negotiations alongside neighbours with whom they had little prior 
working relationship, meaning that a key obstacle for one local negotiator was ‘selling [the 
deal] back to our own councils’. This has affected front stage outcomes. In late 2016 the 
Lincolnshire and Norfolk / Suffolk deals collapsed after some participating councils refused to 
sign up to deals their leaders had backed. Any trust generated did not percolate through to front 
stage. The sharp transitions were exacerbated by the Government’s anxiety to see deals 
published quickly. One think-tank representative said that a major driver was ‘politicians 
wanting to announce things’.  
 
Breaking deadlocks and pursuing innovation  
 
The Government stated that it welcomed innovative ideas in its bids. A deliberate decision was 
taken to avoid guidance, but research findings indicated that this led some areas to simply 
demand the powers available in the initial deals. As one Treasury official said, ‘What is the 
counterfactual of guidance? Precedent’. But this may have had a counter-productive effect. 
Each area was encouraged to keep negotiations private, to include only key politicians and not 
to share information about bids with other stakeholders. There was limited opportunity 
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therefore to learn from other areas or to encourage wider debate about what should be devolved. 
Moreover, there was little or no opportunity to develop creative and innovative ideas with other 
stakeholders. Contrary to creating an innovative culture (Wynen et al, 2014), this element of 
back stage working prevented the sharing of best practice amongst local areas and stifled policy 
innovation. One local negotiator said they did ‘not want to be giving away [our] best ideas to 
others’.  
 
What are the implications of back stage decision making for democratic accountability? 
 
The deliberative process 
 
A process of deliberation should include all interested parties affected by the decisions, as those 
excluded from the process may feel their views are not adequately represented (Elliott, 2012). 
Some scholars suggest that good quality deliberation can broaden out the range of stakeholders 
involved (Sorensen 2016) but in the case of the devolution deals this does not appear to have 
been the case. Only local authority leaders and Local Economic Partnership (LEP) 
representatives have participated in deal negotiations to date, with no information becoming 
available to other stakeholders until the deal is concluded and published (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2015). This was consistent across interviewees and focus group participants. One 
stated that they had involved the chamber of commerce, with whom they had a long-standing 
relationship, but not the public: this came after the deal was concluded.  
 
The devolution deal process serves to highlight that back stage informal governance can also 
exclude groups from decision-making. Bailey et al (2015) suggest that many local stakeholders 
felt excluded from the process, leaving them feeling ill-informed and disconnected from 
decisions. Central government representatives suggested that ministers believed that elected 
councillors should lead the negotiation process, with support from the LEP. In advance of 
various deals collapsing, they acknowledged that the ‘ratification’ process, involving veto 
players in the form of elected councillors, was a risk and would not be ‘a formality’.  
 
Thus the limited degree of deliberation could threaten the long-term success of the policy. This 
could arise not only from deals failing, but from electoral disengagement and lack of public 
interest in the potential for devolution deals. One think tank representative suggested that ‘we 
will see more public engagement when things go wrong, when we fail to make the case 
convincingly’. Another local authority official at the focus group suggested that the 
Government was ‘pushing things down in the expectation that when it all goes wrong they can 
grab it back’. Such views lie squarely within the ‘British political tradition’, but they hint that 
in this instance the transition from back to front stage has been managed ineffectively. A more 
expansive back stage process, together with a front stage process clarified in advance, would 
guard against public and stakeholder discontentment.  
 
Democratic accountability  
 
The front stage of English devolution makes use of conventional accountability processes. 
Mayors will be directly-elected, subject to audit by the National Audit Office and to scrutiny 
by a combined authority scrutiny committee. However, ‘there is no source of democratic 
accountability for the shape of devolution deals’ … ‘few attempts were made either to engage 
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the public in devolution bids or to assert that the new structures would improve democratic 
engagement’ (think tank official). Without such involvement, a back stage process that 
concerns extending local democratic decision making is vulnerable to challenge, and this can 
be seen in evidence of public opposition or relative indifference to the mayoralties. The 
Communities and Local Government Committee recorded considerable disquiet on a visit to 
Manchester (CLG Committee, 2016). Campaign groups have been established in Manchester 
and Sheffield in opposition to the proposed mayoralty and they have expressed concerns about 
the lack of consultation surrounding the deal.  
 
The creation of mayors could be viewed as an attempt at a post hoc democratic legitimation of 
the back stage process. The mayor acts as a short-cut to subjecting the back stage decisions to 
a degree of democratic accountability, media scrutiny and public sector financial scrutiny 
(Bovens et al, 2014). This aligns with the view of back stage and front stage being used in a 
complementary manner in the devolution deal process (Lauth, 2013). This perspective casts 
the government’s insistence on directly-elected mayoralties for strong devolution deals in a 
different light. It may be that the Government views direct election as a vital democratic 
corrective to the decision to take such a wide range of decisions back stage. Turnout at the first 
mayoral elections in 2017 was 27%, suggesting that a sharp move to direct election, with no 
opportunity for further discussion on the nature of the policy, did not compensate for omitting 
stakeholders at back stage.  
 
PART V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Evidence shows that English devolution deals have been negotiated almost entirely via 
informal governance at the back stage. This has helped participants make great strides in a 
policy area with a long history of impasses, high passions and low trust. The contrast with the 
2000s is striking. New Labour’s regional government initiative was conducted almost entirely 
at front stage, but no mechanisms were created to build central trust in regional institutions to 
exercise power and discretion. This contributed to a general ineffectiveness (Pearce and Ayres, 
2012). The process in the 2010s has not been without its ambiguities, but it appears to have 
tackled high levels of complexity and uncertainty effectively. The central claim made in this 
article is that the transition between back and front stage has been flawed. The secrecy of back 
stage negotiations around the devolution deals has led to public and political mistrust between 
back stage negotiators and front stage stakeholders in some areas - ultimately leading to policy 
failure.  
On the one hand this account can be viewed as the latest chapter in the power-hoarding instincts 
of the British political system (Richards and Smith 2015). From this perspective informal 
governance can be viewed as a form of strategic statecraft to exert top down influence and 
control, emblematic of historic central-local relations in the UK (Blunkett et al, 2016). As 
Ayres (2017, 103) notes, ‘by using informal means to shape local aspirations behind closed 
doors, the “shadow of hierarchy” was operationalised in more subtle ways, thus potentially 
supporting claims of a devolution deception’. On the other hand, our findings are more nuanced 
than this account describes. Evidence also indicates a genuine desire on the part of critical 
actors involved in the process to drive forward devolution where previous initiatives had failed, 
to look for innovative policy solutions and to generate trust and goodwill between central and 
local actors. While there were differences of opinion on final outcomes, these observations 
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were expressed by central, local and non-state actors in both our interviews and focus group. 
Back stage negotiations were seen as a route to achieving the transfer of power to the local 
level and can account for why there has been such a ‘step change’ in inter-governmental 
relations compared with previous governments (Sandford, 2017).  
The challenge for policy makers moving forward, therefore, is to strike the right balance 
between the flexibility afforded by informality and demands for greater democratic 
accountability. The transition between the back and front stages needs to be managed more 
effectively and our findings indicate a number of ways in which this might be achieved.  
First, the rationale behind devolution is often purported to be about bringing decision making 
closer to the people and local stakeholders. Nonetheless, this is at odds with the devolution deal 
process itself, which has been criticised as top town, elitist and exclusionary (Richards and 
Smith, 2015). For a policy that concerns the relationship between governors and the governed, 
this disjuncture has demonstrably jarred with stakeholder and public opinion. Central 
government’s apathy towards public engagement is evidenced by the speed at which devolution 
deals were agreed, leaving very little time for local consultation. A lack of public awareness 
and opportunities for consultation have undermined an effective transition between back and 
front stage. Public information and consultation at critical stages in the process might alleviate 
this risk. 
Second, the government’s use of ‘fuzzy governance’ (Flinders et al, 2015) as a form of 
statecraft to manage complexity and uncertainty and to allow itself wriggle room has resulted 
in a number of deficiencies. For example, the lack of any formal guidance in the early stages 
of the devolution process resulted in many of the later bids simply emulating those agreed 
earlier. Rather than informality promoting innovation, it resulted in a high level of uniformity 
across bids. Some ‘light touch’ guidance provided at front stage might have mitigated against 
this outcome.  
Third, the move towards more transactional and negotiated deal making (Sandford, 2017) 
clearly advantaged some areas over others. Those with a history of partnership working and 
established high trust relationships with central government were best able to champion local 
interests. This issue was compounded by limited resources at the centre to deal effectively with 
the number of bids submitted (NAO, 2015), leaving some areas feeling side lined. Operating 
back stage can be resource intensive. Ensuring that personnel with the right levels of skill and 
seniority are in place will help to provide ‘parity of opportunity’ to local areas.   
Fourth, back stage decision making afforded the political momentum to drive forward 
devolution deals. It also served to build trust amongst core elites at central and local level. 
However, the requirement for secrecy undermined any potential for local areas to share 
information and best practice. This is particularly striking given the challenges of resourcing 
the bid process. While some areas of the negotiation might best remain back stage, the blanket 
‘shut down’ in local dialogue undermined the potential for policy innovation - a point that 
should be redressed moving forward. Moreover, allowing some elements of the bids to be 
discussed more openly would permit a ‘softer’ transition between back and front stage.  
Finally, the evidence presented in this article makes an original contribution to the interactive 
governance literature (Ansell and Torfing, 2016) by concluding that the short term efficiency 
gains derived from back stage decision making are threatened over the longer term without 
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careful management of the transition to the front stage. In particular, if back stage processes do 
not engage relevant stakeholders and the public then policy effectiveness can be stymied when 
the front stage arrives. At this point, the trade-off between policy effectiveness and democratic 
accountability becomes visible.  
 
  
15 
 
PART VI. REFERENCES 
 
Ansell, C. and Torfing, J. (eds) (2016) Handbook on Theories of Governance (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar).      
 
Ayres, S. (2017) Assessing the impact of informal governance on political innovation’, Public 
Management Review, 19:1, 90-107.   
 
Ayres, S. and Pearce, G. (2013) ‘A Whitehall perspective on decentralisation in England’s 
emerging territories’, Special Issue, Local Economy, 28: 7-8, 799-814. 
 
Bailey, D., Lyall, S., and Wood, M. (2015) Democracy: the Missing Link in the Devolution 
Debate. London: New Economics Foundation. 
 
Barber, B. (2013) If mayors ruled the world: Dysfunctional nations, rising cities, US, Yale 
University Press.  
 
Bentley, G., Pugalis, L. and Shutt, J. (2016 forthcoming) ‘Leadership and systems of 
governance: the constraints on the scope for leadership of place-based development in 
subnational territories’, Regional Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2016.1181261. 
 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2016) Rethinking Governance (London: Routledge).   
 
Blomqvist, P. (2016) ‘Soft and hard governing tools’, in Ansell, C. and Torfing, J. (eds) 
Handbook on Theories of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 267-281.     
 
Blunkett, D., Flinders M. and Prosser B. (2016), ‘Devolution, Evolution, Revolution … 
Democracy? What’s really happening to English local governance?’, Political Quarterly 87: 4, 
553-564. DOI: 10.1111/1467-923X.12282 
Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E. and Schillemans, T. (2014) The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Brie, M. and Stolting, E. (2013) ‘Formal institutions and informal institutional arrangements’, 
in Christiansen, T. and Neuhold, C. (eds), International Handbook on Informal Governance 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 19-40.  
 
Centre for Public Scrutiny (2015) Devo why? Devo how? Questions (and some answers) about 
governance under English devolution. London: CfPS 
 
Christiansen, T. and Neuhold, C. Eds. (2013) International Handbook on Informal Governance 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
 
City Growth Commission (2014) Unleashing Metro Growth. London: Royal Society for the 
Arts. 
 
Communities and Local Government Committee [House of Commons] (2016) Devolution: the 
next five years and beyond. HC 369 2015-16. London: HMSO. 
 
16 
 
Conservative Party (2015) Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More 
Secure Future. London: Conservative Party. 
 
Cox, E., Henderson, G., and Raikes, L (2014) Decentralisation Decade: A plan for economic 
prosperity, public service transformation and democratic renewal in England. London: 
IPPR/PwC. 
 
Elliott, L. (2012) ‘Legality and legitimacy The environmental challenge’, in Falk, R., 
Juergensmeyer, M. and Popovski, V. (eds) Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 365-387.   
 
Flinders, M., Bache, I., Bartel, I. and Marsden, G. (2015) ‘Blame games and climate change: 
Accountability, multi-level governance and carbon management’, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 17: 1, 64-88.  
 
Friedman, R. (1995) Front Stage, Backstage: The Dramatic Structure of Labour Negotiations. 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press).   
 
Hajer, M. (2003) ‘Policy without polity? Policy analysis and the institutional void’, Policy 
Sciences, 36, 195-2003.   
 
Hambleton R. (2017). “The super-centralisation of the English state – why we need to move 
beyond the devolution deception”. Local Economy 32 (1), 3-13 
Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2013) ‘Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research 
agenda’, in Christansen, T. and Neuhold, C. Ed, pp 85-117.  
 
HM Treasury (2016b) Cambridgeshire and Peterborough East Anglia Devolution Proposal. 
London: HMSO 
 
HM Treasury (2015) Autumn Statement 2015. London: HMSO 
 
House of Lords (2016). Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee: 26th Report of 2016-17. 
London: House of Lords  
 
Jitske van, P, V. and Buuren van, A. (2016) ‘Decision making patterns in multilevel 
governance: the contribution of informal and procedural interactions to significant multilevel 
decisions’, Public Management Review, 18, 7, 951-971. 
 
Kenealy D. (2016) ‘A Tale of One City: The Devo Manc Deal and its implications for English 
devolution’, Political Quarterly, 87:4, 572-581. 
 
Kenny, M. (2016) ‘Englishness Politicised?: Unpicking the Normative Implications of the 
McKay Commission’. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17, 152-170.   
 
Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E. H. and Koppenjan, J. F. M. (eds) (1997) Managing Complex 
Networks (London: Sage). 
 
Klijn, E. H. (2014) ‘Political leadership in networks’, in Rhodes, R. A. W. and ‘T Hart, P. 
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 403-417.  
17 
 
 
Klijn, E. H. and Koppenjan, J. (2016) Governance Networks in the Public Sector (London: 
Routledge).  
 
Klike, A. (2016) ‘Democratic theory’, in Ansell, C. and Torfing, J. (eds) Handbook on Theories 
of Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar) 86-102.      
 
Kort, M. and Klijn, E, H. (2012) ‘Public-private partnerships in urban regeneration: Democratic 
legitimacy and its relation with performance and trust’, Local Government Studies, 39: 1, 89-
106.  
 
Lane, C. and Bachman, R. (1998) (eds) Trust Within and Between Organisations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).  
 
Lauth, H, J. (2013) ‘Informal governance and democratic theory’, in Christiansen, T. and 
Neuhold, C. (eds), International Handbook on Informal Governance (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar) 40-64.   
 
Lyall, S., Wood D. and Bailey D. (2015), Democracy: the missing link in the devolution 
debate (Sheffield: University of Sheffield).  
Mawson J., and Bradbury J. (2006) Devolution, Regionalism and Regional Development: the 
UK Experience - Regions and Cities. (London: Taylor & Francis).  
 
NAO [National Audit Office]. (2016). English devolution deals. HC-948 2015-16. London: 
HMSO. 
 
 
O’Brien, P. and Pike, A. (2015) ‘City deals, decentralisation and the governance of local 
infrastructure funding and financing in the UK’. National Institute Economic Review, No 233, 
August.  
 
Pearce, G. and Ayres, S. (2012) ‘Back to the local? Recalibrating the regional tier of 
governance in England’. Regional and Federal Studies, 22: 1, 1-24. 
 
Pike, A. Coombes, M., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney. J. (2016a forthcoming): Austerity states, 
institutional dismantling and the governance of sub-national economic development: the 
demise of the regional development agencies in England. Territory, Politics, Governance, 
DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2016.1228475 
 
Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P., and Tomaney, J. (2016b). Decentralisation: 
issues, principles and practice. Newcastle: Newcastle University.  
 
PSA (Political Studies Association) (2016) Examining the role of ‘informal governance’ on 
devolution to England’s cities. London: PSA. 
 
Prosser B., Renwick A., Giovannini A. and Sandford M. (2017). “Citizen participation and 
changing governance: cases of devolution in England”. Policy &Politics 45:2, 251-269 
18 
 
Randall, J. and Casebourne J. (2016) Making devolution deals work. London: Institute for 
Government 
 
Reh, C. (2013) ‘Informal politics: the normative challenge’, in Christiansen, T. and Neuhold, 
C. (eds), International Handbook on Informal Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 65-
84. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (2013) ‘Political anthropology and civil service reform: prospects and limits’. 
Policy & Politics, 41: 4, 481-490.  
 
Richards, D. and Smith, M., (2015) ‘Devolution in England, the British Political Tradition 
and the Absence of Consultation, Consensus and Consideration’, Representation, 51: 4, 385-
401. 
Sandford, M. (2017) ‘Signing up to devolution: the prevalence of contract over governance in 
English devolution policy’, Regional and Federal Studies, 27, 1, 63-82. 
 
Sandford, M. (2016) Devolution to local government in England. London: House of Commons 
Library.  
 
Scharpf, F. W. (1993) Games in Hierarchies and Networks (Colorado: West View Press).  
 
Sorensen, E. (2016) ‘Enhancing policy innovation by re-designing representative democracy’. 
Policy & Politics, 44: 2, 155-170.  
 
Tomaney, J. (2016) ‘The Limits of Devolution: Localism, Economics and Post-democracy’. 
Political Quarterly 87:4, 546-552. 
  
Torfing, J. (2016) ‘Metagovernance’, in Ansell, C. and Torfing, J. (eds) Handbook on Theories 
of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), 525-538.     
 
Torfing, J., Peters, B, G., Pierre, J. and Sorensen, E. (2012) Interactive Governance: Advancing 
the Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
 
Waite, D., Maclennan, D. and O’Sullivan, T. (2013) Emerging city policies: devolution, deals 
and disorder. Local Economy, 28: 7-8, 770-785.  
 
Whitley, P., Clarke, H. D., Sanders, D. and Stewart, M. (2016) ‘Why Do Voters Lose Trust in 
Governments? Public Perceptions of Government Honesty and Trustworthiness in Britain 
2000-2013’. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18: 1, 234-254.   
 
Wright, T. (2004) ‘Prospects for Parliamentary Reform’. Parliamentary Affairs, 57: 4, 867-
876.  
 
Wynen, J., Verhoest, K., Ongaro, E. and Van Thiel, S. (2014) ‘Innovation-oriented culture in 
the public sector: Do managerial autonomy and result control lead to innovation?’. Public 
Management Review, 16: 1, 45-66.   
